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ing upon the parties in other fields of substantive law are not control-
ling insofar as tax law is concerned. The validity of this statement was
shown clearly in Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States3s when the
court stated that "in tax matters the trend in federal courts is to apply
the designation fiduciary to many relationships involving trust and
confidence, whether they are such under state law or not."3 9
It may therefore be concluded that a trend is appearing in which a
relationship may be taxable under the Internal Revenue Code per-
taining to trusts even though the party did not intend a trust and
equity would not imply one. The rule that no entity will be taxable
as a trust unless it would be regarded as such in equity can no longer
be considered the law. With the Supreme Court's mandate that the
"legislative design is to tax all gain constitutionally taxable unless
specifically excluded,"' 4 0 as a starting point, it seems fairly certain that
the rule of United States v. DeBonchamps will become established
doctrine.
JOSEPH E. Uizxas
CHILD CUSTODY ACROSS STATE LINES
The area of child custody which crosses into the domain of con-
flict of laws is an entangled mass of inconsistent awards, decrees and
orders.' This lack of uniformity has given rise to custody decree
abuses which not only go unreproved, but far too often result in
advantage to the recalcitrant. Probably the most prevalent of such
violations is the abducting of a child from the custodian by a parent.
How and why such conduct is resorted to and often rendered advan-
tageous in subsequent custody actions can be best understood by con-
sidering the jurisdictional aspects of such actions.
38181 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 196o).
1Id. at 915. See also, Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78,
8o (4th Cir. 1954); American Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 84 F.2d 181, 182-83 (ioth Cir.
1936); Commissioner v. Owens, 78 F.2d 768, 773-74 (ioth Cir. 1935); Buddey v. Com-
missioner, 66 F.2d 394, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1933); Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 848, 85o
(ist Cir. 1932).
'General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioners, 348 U.S. 434, 436 (1955).
2Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev.
42, 59 (i94o)- See generally, Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State
Lines, io Law & Contemp. Prob. 81g (944), wherein Stansbury advocates concurrenit
jurisdiction as a means of uniformity: "May it not be that these jurisdictional dashes
could be largely avoided by conceding jurisdiction to the courts of two or more
states simultaneously?" io Law & Contemp. Prob. at 83o. -
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The recent case of Lennon v. Lennon2 illustrates the type of
strategy used in child custody battles. In Lennon the defendant-father
had an adulterous affair with a married woman. During that time
the plaintiff-mother had serious emotional disturbances, became an
alcoholic, and received institutional treatment. The two children
of the marriage were taken care of by their maternal grandparents.
In due course the mother's treatment was completed and she was
discharged. She filed suit for divorce, asking for alimony and custody
of the children. A temporary restraining order was issued against
the father, but the pending suit and restraining order were dismissed
because of a subsequent reconciliation of the. parties. While resuming
cohabitation with his wife, the father did not discontinue his affair.
As a result, the mother again resorted to excessive use of alcohol. The
father went to Nevada, taking the children with him, without the
mother's prior knowledge or consent. In Nevada he obtained an ex
parte divorce3 and was awarded custody of the children. Twenty days
later the father and his paramour were married, and thereafter they,
with the two children, made thir home in Nevada. About six months
later the father allowed the children to visit their mother in North
Carolina.4 The evidence was in conflict as to whether the mother
promised to return them to the father. In fact, the mother refused
to return the children and instead instituted habeas corpus proceed-
ings to determine custody.5 The lower court awarded custody to
the mother,6 and the father appealed.
The first question before the North Carolina court was that of
2252 N.C. 659, 114 S.E.2d 571 (1960).
3With regard to the validity of such a divorce, see Williams v. North Carolina
II, 325 US. 226 (1945), affirming 224 N.C. 193, 29 S.E.2d 744 (1944). Williams v.
North Carolina I, 317 US. 287 (1942), reversing 22o N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941)-
'North Carolina was the mother's domicile and the matrimonial domicile of
the parties. 114 S.E.2d at 576.
1N.C. Gen. Stats. § 17-39.1 (Supp. 1959). Prior to 1957, habeas corpus could not
be used to determine the right to custody of children whose parents had been di-
vorced; but under § 17-39.1 the marital status of parents is no longer a factor in
determining whether habeas corpus is proper procedure to obtain custody of a
child. Cleeland v. Cleeland, 249 N.C. i6, 1o5 S.E.2d 114 (1958).
6The lower court's decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff-mother upon con-
dition that she and the children continue to reside in her parents' home, and
upon the further condition that she totally abstain from the use of alcoholic
beverages. 114 S.E.2d at 547. It is interesting to speculate as to the mother's status
should she remarry. Query as to whether she and the children would be required to
remain living with the mother's parents. What if the mother had a "social drink,"
would she lose custody of the children? From the language used in the decree it
appears that any contact whatever with alcohol would be a violation of the court's
order. Are decrees with such conditions desirable? Are such conditions conducive to
a proper state of mind in rearing children?
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jurisdiction to determine custody. There were three broad approaches
available. First, the court could have followed prior North Carolina
precedents indicating that North Carolina will not assume jurisdic-
tion unless the child is both domiciled and physically present in the
state. Second, the court could have undertaken to resolve the prob-
lem by following the rationale of May v. Anderson,7 which propounds
the rule that personal jurisdiction over both parents is the juris-
dictional test in child custody actions. Third, the court could have
sought a resolution of the case in accordance with both North Carolina
precedents and May v. Anderson. The latter approach was taken and
the lower court's holding was affirmed.
North Carolina precedents are based on the theory that a court's
determination of custody is an adjudication of the domestic status of
the child, thus the action is considered an in rem proceeding.8 But the
action differs from other in rem proceedings in that the foremost
purpose must be the determination of what course is in the best in-
terests of the child, and not the settlement of the rights of two con-
tending parties.9 Even so, there is a difficulty. The res may be the
child itself,' 0 so that jurisdiction is based on the physical presence of
the child." On the other hand, the res may be thought of as the
domicile of the child. Therefore, domicile becomes the jurisdictional
7345 U.S. 528 (1953)- See generally, annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 673, 677 (1957); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.2d 306 (195o); Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 623 (195o); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949).
'Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798, 80o (1948) (dictum); Goodrich,
Custody of Children in Divoce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1 (921). But see Stumberg,
The Status of Chilren in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 42, 56 (94o).
9Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8. U. Chi. L. Rev.
42, 56 (1940)-
"'Duryea v. Duryea, 46 Idaho 512, 269 Pac. 987 (1928); Weddington v. Wed-
dington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d
798, 800 (1948) (dictum).
uSheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 At. x (1936); State ex rel. Ranken v.
Superior Court, 6 Wash. 2d go, io6 P.2d 1082 (194o). See Henn v. Children's Agency,
204 Fed. 766 (9 th Cir. 1913) (juvenile dependency and deliquency); Kelsey v.
Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 Atl. 679 (1897) (guardianship); State ex rel. Rasco v. Rasco,
139 Fla. 349, 19o So. 510 (1939) (divorce); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 280 Mass. 216,
182 N.E. 374 (1932) (petition for custody); Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 256
N.V. 833 (1934) (habeas corpus); In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 18 N.V.2d 147
(1945) (guardianship); Ex parte Olcott, 141 N.J. Eq. 8, 55 A.2d 820 (1947) (juvenile
dependency and delinquency); In re Williams, 77 N.J. Eq. 478, 77 Ad 350 (1910)
(habeas corpus); Finlay v. Finlay, 24 o N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925) (bill in equity);
In re Stringer, 26 Ohio Op. 4, 11 Ohio Supp. 6o (1940) (adoption); Rogers v.
Commonwealth, 176 Va. 355, 11 S.E.2d 584 (194o) (juvenile dependency and delin-
quency). There is authority, however, that it is of no avail to the court's jurisdic-
tion to bring a non-resident child into the state unlawfully. Shippen v. Bailey,
303 Ky. 1o, 196 S.V.2d 425 (1946) (habeas corpus); In re Hubbard, 82 N.Y. go (1880)
(guardianship).
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requirement for the determination of child custody even though the
,child may be physically without the state.12 The reason behind using
domicile as the jurisdictional test is that the domiciliary state is
better suited than any other to understand and provide for the best
interests of its children. This denotes a complete departure from the
early common-law rule that the father had absolute authority over
his family.
Because custody actions adjudicate so-called status, domicile of
the 'child as well as his presence within the geographic bounds of the
court's authority is essential to give jurisdiction in the majority of
states.13 This is generally considered the rule in North Carolina.' 4
North Carolina further holds that a prior court's custody award has
no binding force in a new state of domicile.' 5 Hence, had the court
assumed jurisdiction, using North Carolina precedents as the sole
jurisdictional criterion in Lennon, it might have resulted in a con-
flict with the doctrine of May v. Anderson.'6 Also, to follow exclusively
the North Carolina precedents on Lennon's facts would have been to
deny jurisdiction since the majority and general rule is that when
the parents are separated a child's domicile follows that of his legal
custodian,'7 or in the absence of a custody decree, that of his father.'8
The North Carolina court could have rested its decision in Len-
uSampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Breene v.
People ex rel. Breene, 51 Colo. 342, il 7 Pac. wooO (1911); Moody v. Moody, 193 Ga.
699, 19 S.E.2d 5o4 (1942); Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P.2d 52 (1933);
Heard v. Heard, 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E.2d 219 (1948); Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358
Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949); White v. White, 77 N.H. 26, 86 At. 353 (1913);
Hatch v. Hatch, 15 N.J. Misc. 461, 192 Ad. 241 (1937); Robinson v. Robinson, 254
App. Div. 696, 3 N.Y.S.2d 882 (2d Dep't 1938); Hughes v. Hughes, i8o Ore. 575, 178
P.2d 170 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel. Camp v. Camp, 15o Pa. Super. 649, 29 A..d
363 (1942); Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946); Re McGibbon,
13 Alta. 196, 39 D.L.R. 177 (1918) See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 145 (1934);
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws §§ 36-40 (3 d ed. 1949); Beale, The Status of Children
in the Conflict of Laws, i U. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 22 (1933). See also Goodrich, Custody
of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1, 5 (1921).
132 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 144.3 (1935). But see annot., 9 A.L.R.ad 434,
442 (1950).
"Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956); Hoskins v. Curin, 242
N.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 228 (1955); Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 69 S.E.2d 313 (1952);
Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951)-
11Ex parte Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911).
"See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 32 (1934); Beale, Conflict of Laws § 32.1 (1935).
"SGlass. v. Glass, 26o Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1927). The modem view is
said to be that the child takes his mother's domicile if the separation was through
the father's fault. Beale, Conflict of Laws § 32.1 (1935). See Stansbury, Custody
and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, io Law & Contemp. Prob. 819, 821-22
(1944).
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non squarely on May v. Anderson. May holds that personal jurisdic-
tion over both parents is indispensable to jurisdiction in a child cus-
tody proceeding. Under this rule a parent may not be deprived of the
custody of his child unless the parent is personally served with process
within the forum or appears generally in the proceeding, either in
person or by attorney. It would not seem, however, that the Court in
May held that personal jurisdiction over the parents is the exclusive
jurisdictional test in custody proceedings, but merely that such is a
necessary requirement in order for a custody decree to be entitled
to full faith and credit.19 Nevertheless, had the Lennon court taken the
May approach it would have overruled, at least by implication, its
prior precedents as it would not have looked at the children's status,
but only at the parents' status. 20
The majority in May v. Anderson, however, disclaimed that its
decision was applicable where one parent abducts the child and re-
moves him from a state which had jurisdiction.2' Thus, the inference
is that the state from which the child was removed retains jurisdiction
over both the abducting parent and the child. By finding that the
parent in Lennon wrongfully removed the children from North Caro-
lina, the court found common ground with May v. Anderson.m 2 At the
same time, because the children were physically present in North
Carolina, it was not necessary to render a decision that would con-
""We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile because,
even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin [the state to which the
children were removed], certainly as against Ohio [the mother's domicile] the per-
sonal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her per-
sonal right to their immediate possession." 345 US. at 534. See Hazard, May v.
Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L Rev. 379, 383-84, 390-91 (1959).
"The court's reasoning would have been- since the defendant father has been
personally served with process within the state of North Carolina, and is now per-
sonally and generally before the North Carolina court, we have personal jurisdiction
over him. The plaintiff-mother who instituted this action is also before the court
generally. Therefore, based on May v. Anderson, we need look no further as we have
valid jurisdiction over the parties.
2"The instant case does not present the special considerations that arise where
a parent, with or without minor children, leaves a jurisdiction for the purpose of
escaping process or otherwise evading jurisdiction, and we do not have here the on-
siderations that arise when children are unlawfully or surreptitiously taken by one
parent from the other." 345 US. at 534-35 n.8.
"See note 21 supra. The inference from Justice Burton's majority opinion in
May is that the state from which the children were removed (North Carolina) re-
tains jurisdiction over both the abducting parent and the child when the parent
takes such action to deprive that state of jurisdiction. It is essential to re-emphasize
this point in evaluating Lennon. See Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law
Across State Lines, io Law & Contemp. Prob. 819, 832 (1944); Hazard, May v. Ander-
son: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L. Rev. 379, 383 .(ig59).
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flict with the past North Carolina precedents. Unfortunately, the ques-
don of the children's domicile could not be so readily resolved.23
In seeking to find common ground with May v.-Anderson and
past North Carolina precedents, the Lennon court used rather ques-
tionable language in regard to jurisdiction. The basic problem to be
resolved is the fundamental conflict between in rem jurisdiction and
in personam jurisdiction: domicile plus physical presence equals
valid jurisdiction to determine child custody under North Carolina
case law; personal jurisdiction over both parents equals valid juris-
diction to determine child custody under the United States Supreme
Court decision of May v. Anderson. The North Carolina court sought
to reconcile these two approaches, but its basis for doing so is not en-
tirely dear.
The court may be saying that the children are physically present in
North Carolina and are now residing there with their mother,24
therefore it has in rem jurisdiction to determine their custody. And,
as the defendant-father has been served with process within North
Carolina and both he and the plaintiff-mother have pleaded to the
merits, the court below had jurisdiction to issue a custody decree en-
titled to full faith and credit in the other states. This appears to be
correctly applying both North Carolina precedents and May v. Ander-
son to the jurisdictional questions raised in Lennon.25
However, the thought in Lennon could be that North Carolina has
a continuing jurisdiction when a parent wrongfully removes a child
from North Carolina and establishes domicile outside that state. May
v. Anderson can be interpreted as holding that its requirement of per-
'lThe lower court held as a matter of law that the children were "residents of
and domiciled in North Carolina." i 4 S.E.2d at 574. The North Carolina Supreme
Court made no mention of the children's domicile in its opinion. It is not clear,
however, whether the father assigned the lower court's holding as error. If he did
not it appears that he should have, as domicile is necessary, according to past North
Carolina precedents, for that state to grant jurisdiction in child custody proceedings.
See note 14 supra. On the other hand, it can be reasoned that the North Carolina
court, by following May v. Anderson, was not required to determine the children's
domicile even in light of its past precedents. See note 9 supra. If such be the case,
query as to jurisdiction over subject matter under North Carolina law.
"Actually the children had been living with their mother in their maternal
grandparent's home for the past eleven months. 114 S.E.2d at 577-
'See notes 19 and 21 supra. See also Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to
Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L. Rev. 379, 393-94 (1959)- This analysis seems correct as
the court would be saying North Carolina can determine custody of these children
because it has valid jurisdiction over the subject matter (the children) and personal
jurisdiction over the parents (plaintiff-mother and defendant-father), and since
Nevada did not have such jurisdiction, North Carolina is not required to give full
faith and credit to its decree.
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sonal jurisdiction over both parents does not apply to the Lennon
situation; consequently, since May's test does not apply, it can be in-
ferred that the state from which the children were removed retains
jurisdiction over both the abducting parent and the child. Such a
position is indeed questionable, if not arbitrary, and might be con-
sidered unconstitutional if the father did not appear in the North
Carolina proceeding.
26
May v. Anderson has given rise to a great deal of confusion and
inconsistency in the area of child custody.27 Under the majority opin-
ion the court in a second state may ignore the decree of a court in the
first state if the parent adversely affected was not a party thereto.28
On the other hand, it appears that under Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion a parent could appear in the first proceeding, litigate
to the end, and if he loses, simply take the child to some other state
and start all over again.
It is disturbing to discover that such an important field of the law
is in a state of chaos. What is the answer? Not even the authoritative
writers can agree. Beale's Restatement of Conflicts says that the child's
domicile is not only sufficient, but is the exclusive basis for determin-
ing his custody.30 Goodrich is in accord with Beale.31 This view has
"If the defendant-father in Lennon had stayed out of the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, or if he had appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction or the children's
domicile, then North Carolina's determination of the children's custody would
have violated the May Doctrine. Thus, the defendant-father would have been granted
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, in all probability, as North Carolina's
decision would have been unconstitutional in that it had cut off the father's right
to his children without personal jurisdiction over him. See Meredith v. Meredith,
226 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
nHazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L. Rev.
379 (959)-
21See Meredith v. Meredith, 226 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Cooper v. Cooper, 318
S.NW.2d 587 (Ark. 1958); Dahlke v. Dahke, 97 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1957); Aufiero v. Aufiero,
332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Hutchins v. Moore, 231 Miss. 772, 97 So. 2d
748 (1957); Guyette v. Haley, 286 App. Div. 451, 145 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Kallet v. Fitzpatrick, 131 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Cunningham v. Cunningham,
166 Ohio St. 203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1957); Swope v. Swope, 163 Ohio St. 59, 125 N.E.2d
336 (1955). But see Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 6o4, on remand, 248 N.C. 742, 104
S.E.2d 882 (1958).
"Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E.2d 709 (1955); Casteel v. Casteel, 45
N.J. Super. 338, 132 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Gregory v.
Gregory, x88 Pa. Super. 350 , 146 A.2d 624 (1958). Cf. Bachman v. Mejias, i N.Y.2d
575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956) (holding that full faith and credit does not apply to
custody decrees).
'*Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 117, 146, 148 (1934). But see id. at §§ 118, i5o.
"Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 136 (3 d ed. 1949). Compare the same author's
Larlier statement that this "is not an open and shut proposition...." Goodrich,
Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1, 2 (1921).
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generally been repudiated by the other writers who essentially agree
that considerations of comity and full faith and credit should be aban-
doned, with consideration for the welfare of the child established as
the criterion.32 The best solution may be to utilize the constitutional
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in diversity cases to ob-
tain decrees binding on parties domiciled in different states.33 Of
course, this means that the statute requiring a jurisdictional amount
in diversity cases would have to be changed so as not to apply to
custody proceedings. The most important feature of the federal court's
determination would be that its finding would be conclusive and bind-
ing on both parties as the court would have personal jurisdiction
over both parties.
34
At present no court can enter a binding custody decree, as the
conclusive effect only relates to the conditions that existed at the
time the decree was entered. 35 Surely it must be conceded that the
=i Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 277 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recog-
nition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich L. Rev. 345, 374 (1953); Hazard, May v. Ander-
son: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 Va. L. Rev. 379, 383 ('959); Stansbury,
Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, io Law & Contemp. Prob. 8ig,
822 (944). Cf. Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 42, 57-58 (1940).
nRitz, Migratory Alimony: A Constitutional Dilemma in the Exercise of in
Personam Jurisdiction, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 83, 101-04 (196o). Although Professor
Ritz's theory applies to use of the federal courts for a determination of jurisdiction
in alimony proceedings it would appear to operate just as satisfactorily in custody
proceedings.
129 Fordham L. Rev. at 102-03.
3-The mandates of full faith and credit do not require that a sister state give a
more conclusive or final effect to a judgment than the state in which it was rendered.
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 61o (1947). Most states have statutes that
allow their courts to modify custody decrees that they have rendered. Therefore, since
the courts of the state that rendered the decree could themselves modify it, the courts
of another state in which enforcement is sought can do the same on the basis of
significant facts not presented or considered at the original proceedings. Ibid. Thee
facts will most frequently take the form of changed circumstances arising after the
original decree was entered.
There is no fixed standard by which to determine what constitutes a change
in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of a prior custody decree. Elders
v. Elders, 2o6 Ga. 297, 57 S.E.2d 83, 85 (195o). It is often stated that altered condi-
tions must be such a substantial and significant nature as to affect materially the
welfare of the child involved. Heavrin v. Spicer, 265 Fed. 977, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1920);
Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1954). However, courts have sometimes
modified custody decrees on the basis of changed circumstances that seem of little
significance. For instance, one court granted modification on the basis of a lapse
of eight months since the rendering of the decree. People ex rel. Brown v. Schiff,
49 N.Y.S.2d'3 o o (Sup. Ct. 1944).
The danger exists that courts will use the changed circumstances rule merely as
a tool enabling them to refuse to give full faith and credit to the decrees of other
states. One court warns of this danger: "As a finding of changed conditions is one
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